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In the analysis of Anaxagoras’ physics in view of the relation 
between his teachings on multitude and heterogeneity, two central 
questions emerge: 1) How can the structure of the universe 
considered purely mereo-topologically help us explain that at the 
first cosmic stage no qualitative difference is manifest in spite of the 
fact that the entire qualitative heterogeneity is supposedly already 
present there? 2) How can heterogeneity become manifest at the 
second stage, resulting from the noûs intervention, if according to 
fragment B 6 such a possibility requires the existence of “the 
smallest”, while according to the general principle stated in 
fragment B 3 there is not “the smallest” but always only “a 
smaller”? This paper showcases the perplexity of these two 
questions but deals only with the former. The answer follows from 
Anaxagoras’ being a thoroughgoing infinitist in the way in which no 
Greek physicist was: the principle of space isotropy operative in 
geometry is extended to physics as well. So any two parts of the 
original mixture are similar to each other not only in view of the 
smaller-larger relation but also because each contains everything 
that the other one contains. This in effect means that at the stage of 
maximal possible heterogeneity each part of any part contains 
infinitely many heterogeneous parts of any kind whatsoever. So, 
neither can there be homogeneous parts in view of any qualitative 
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property, nor can there be predominance in quantity of parts of any 
kind that would make some property manifest.  
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The relation between Anaxagoras’ cosmology and contemporary analytic 
philosophy is twofold. On one hand, there are authors who mention 
Anaxagoras as somebody whose ideas can be viewed as a kind of 
anticipation of certain notions, such as the notion of gunk, of the fractal 
universe or of the singular cosmic event, which have been introduced and 
discussed in contemporary analytic metaphysics and physics. On the other 
hand, there are those who try to clarify Anaxagoras’ doctrine by using the 
method and conceptual apparatus of analytic philosophy. The approach of 
this paper is closer to that of the latter group, for we shall focus on 
Anaxagoras’ teachings on multitude and on heterogeneity in order to 
present his cosmology in a consistent manner and to connect the two 
teachings by filling up gaps in the often only implicit argumentation that 
can be found in the doxography of ancient philosophy. Hopefully, the 
resulting interpretation might be also of help in contemporary 
metaphysical debates such as those concerning the structure of physical 
continua in general and variety of cosmological models in particular. 
 
We shall start with Anaxagoras’ teaching on multitude, because there are 
statements and arguments that can be understood in purely mereo-
topological terms and which as such suggest what the structure of the 
universe looks like in view of how its parts are related regardless of what 
those parts are specifically. After elucidating this point, the first of the two 
central questions will arise: How can such a structure afford the 
explanation of Anaxagoras’ claim that no qualitative difference could be 
manifest (ἔνδηλος) in the original mixture of everything with everything? 
This question is rendered particularly perplexing when we take into 
consideration an additional claim of Anaxagoras, namely that the entire 
qualitative heterogeneity, which is to be manifest only after the 
intervention of noûs, has been actually present in the original mixture from 
eternity (ἐξ αἰῶνος). 
Giving the answer to the above question will complete the main task of the 
paper. But, at the end, we shall also address the second central question, 
complementary to the first one, and mention difficulties related to it. 
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Namely, given the way in which the teaching on multitude provides the 
explanation of why in the original mixture no qualitative difference can be 
manifest, it is not easy to give an account consistent with various 
statements of Anaxagoras about heterogeneity, which he claims may 
become manifest due to the motion caused by noûs. However, the answer 
to this question will be postponed for another occasion. 
 
2. Interlude: Classical Scholarship meets Analytic Philosophy* 
 
In the course of almost century and a half1 of intense scholarly work, 
Anaxagoras has been interpreted in radically different, mutually 
incompatible and divergent ways, probably more so than any other 
Presocratic. This diagnosis of the state of affairs of Anaxagorean 
scholarship has been stated already in the 1950s by J. E. Raven (1954, 123) 
who managed to detect a tendency towards “undue complication” common 
to all competing reconstructions formulated up to then. Interestingly, this 
has become the general opinion applicable also to almost all 
reconstructions formulated since then (as evidenced in McKirahan 2010, 
229) and it is characteristic of both types of authors mentioned in the 
Introduction. The situation up to the ‘50s can be characterised by the 
prevalence of the “old-fashioned nothing-but-philologist” approach (Cleve 
1973, x), detached from (what were then its contemporary) goings-on in 
philosophy, so that Anaxagoras was reserved for the classicists. However, 
a paradigm shift in classical scholarship due primarily to Gregory Vlastos2 
opened up new vistas of research: analytic ancient philosophy was born 
through the application of the tools of logic and analytic metaphysics 
alongside the tools of classical philology in the study of ancient texts. All 
the prerequisites for a philosophical reconstruction (in the sense of Cleve) 
 
* Note. In what follows, the text is divided into two levels represented by 
differently sized fonts. The first, “main level” contains all and only those elements 
which are essential for understanding what we consider to be the accurate 
reconstruction of Anaxagoras’ teaching on the relation between multitude and 
heterogeneity. For this reason, we have made it as free as possible of all but the 
most relevant references to the original texts of the fragments and ancient 
doxographical reports. We introduced the second level (written in smaller font) in 
order to provide detailed references to and critical discussions of previous attempts 
at articulating Anaxagoras’ metaphysics. Nonetheless, the main level can be read 
independently of the second. 
1 It is safe to claim that interest in Anaxagoras’ theory began to grow rapidly after 
the publication of Tannery’s classical exposition in 1887.  
2 For details about the ground-breaking novelties of Vlastos’ approach see, e.g. 
Burnyeat (1992), Mourelatos (1993), and Graham’s introduction in Vlastos 
(1995). 
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of Anaxagoras were thus made available. It might be claimed that Felix M. 
Cleve was anticipating the developments in the ‘50s since his original 
publication concerning Anaxagoras appeared in 1917. 3  The present 
reconstruction can be seen as a continuation of the tradition which he 
inaugurated.  
 
As to the authors of the first type mentioned in the Introduction, i.e. 
contemporary metaphysicians, they acknowledge not only that Anaxagoras 
deserves a rightful place in the history of mereology (see, e.g. Mann and 
Varzi 2006, 593) but also that his style of mereology (details of which are 
worked out in this paper) represents a relevant contender in various 
ongoing mereological debates (Rosen and Dorr 2002, 165–6), primarily 
owing to the fact that his conception can (and, as we believe, should) be 
seen as a form of gunkology, i.e. an ante litteram articulation of what came 
to be known as gunk (following Lewis 1991, 20 et passim). The idea that 
Anaxagoras was a gunk-theorist is not new. Sider (1993), Markosian (2004 
and 2005), Nolan (2006), and Hudson (2007) all credit Anaxagoras’ 
metaphysics with the notion of gunk.  
 
Some authors have also suggested using tools of Mandelbrot’s fractal 
geometry (Mandelbrot 1983) and topology as a means by which we might 
arrive at an adequate model of the Anaxagorean universe (see, e.g. Graham 
1994, 109, Graham 2006, 213 and Drozdek 2005, 173ff.). Probably the 
most elaborate of such attempts can be found in the works of Petar Grujić 
(Grujić 2001, 2002, 2006). Section 4.5. of the present paper presents a 
novel approach to Anaxagorean fractals.  
 
 
3. Multitude from a Merely Mereo-Topological Point of View  
 
3.1.  The Universe as a Gunk 
 
Citing Anaxagoras, Simplicius in Phys. 166.15–16 says that 
“neither of the small is there the smallest, but always a smaller 
(οὔτε τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστι τοὐλάχιστον ἀλλὰ ἔλασσον ἀεί)”, adding that “nor 
is there the largest” (οὔτε τὸ μέγιστον). Immediately after this, Simplicius 
cites Theophrastus, according to whom Anaxagoras’ statement that 
“everything is in everything” (πάντα ἐν παντί) is “based” (διότι) on the fact 
that in view of everything large and small there are “infinitely many larger 
and smaller” (ἐνμεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι ἄπειρα). 
 
The aforementioned quotations from Simplicius constitute Anaxagoras’ 
fragment DK 59 B 3. But what he says there might, on the first reading, be 
 
3 Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion, Vienna, 1917; 
the first English translation appeared in 1949.  
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seen as contradicting what he said previously in B 1 (“in the beginning of 
his Physics”, as Simplicius informs us), namely that “air and aether 
covered all things (πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ κατεῖχεν), both being 
unlimited, for these are the largest (μέγιστα) among all things both in 
quantity and in magnitude (πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει)” (emphasis added). How 
can air and aether be largest, if there is no largest? This apparent 
contradiction can easily be explained away by taking into account what 
Anaxagoras himself says in B 2. What he says in B 1 holds only after “air 
and aether were separated off (ἀποκρίνονται) from the all-encompassing 
multitude (ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος)”. Simply put, at that stage air 
and aether are the only two differentiated manifest things (χρήματα)—
hence, by default, largest—and as such they cover all other non-yet-
manifest things. The point is that the cosmogonical process is gradual: 
separating-off happens in successive stages (ἀποκρίνεσθαι κατὰ τάξιν), as 
Simplicius says in Phys 460.30. Therefore, what Anaxagoras says in B 3 
holds globally, for the entire universe as a whole (τὸ ὅλον), which as such 
contains both the manifest and the not-yet-manifest things, as well as 
locally, for any of the things which are becoming manifest.  
 
In view of the previous explanation of the fact that B 3 holds for all things 
in the universe, one is naturally led to the question about what concretely 
these things supposedly are, of which it is said that there are always smaller 
and larger ones. The answer to this question varies from one interpreter to 
another.  
 
This question is usually construed as the task of listing the basic or non-
basic ingredients of Anaxagoras’ ontology which essentially amounts to 
finding (some or all of) the referents of the often-repeated Anaxagoras’ 
technical general term χρήματα, i.e. “things” or “stuffs”. According to a 
classificatory scheme due to Patricia Curd (Curd 2007, Essay 2), the 
scholars can be classified depending on how permissive they take 
Anaxagoras to be in his conception of “things”. The views fall into three 
groups, ascribing Anaxagoras’ an austere, a moderate or an expansive 
ontology. 
 
Authors who adhere to the first option tend to advocate a reductive reading 
of the extant texts (based upon what Anaxagoras himself says in B 15), 
which results in limiting the list of basic ingredients to the opposites (i.e. 
the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, etc.).4 Contrary to them, the 
“expansionists” favour a non-discriminative reading on which all the stuffs 
(πάντα χρήματα) are treated as being ontologically on a par and for this 
reason it maximally expands the list of ingredients so as to include all the 
 
4 See, e.g. Tannery (1886) and (1887), Burnet (1975), Cornford (1975), Vlastos 
(1975), Schofield (1980), Inwood (1986), Marmodoro (2015, 2017). 
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stuffs it could possibly include, namely the opposites, the elements (fire, 
water, earth, and air), the seeds (σπέρματα), homoeomerous material things 
such as meat and gold, human beings, plants, etc. 5  Finally, 
“moderationists” tend to be less inclusive than expansionists whilst at the 
same time being less exclusive than “reductionists” (see, e.g. Curd 2007).  
 
Curd’s classificatory scheme can be nuanced even further if we raise the 
question what sort of stuffs Anaxagoras has in mind. For instance, 
reductionists typically treat the ingredients as being primarily qualitative 
in nature, i.e. they subscribe to a broadly non-hyletic reading of 
Anaxagoras’ ontology. Namely, they interpret the opposites as immaterial 
yet nonetheless physical substance-like “quality-things” (Cornford 1975, 
305) or tropes, i.e. instantiated properties (Marmodoro 2017, 3-4). On such 
an interpretation, Anaxagoras turns out to be a bundle-theorist: the 
ontologically secondary stuffs are nothing over and above mere bundles of 
(adequately co-located) properties. In Marmodoro’s account (which can be 
seen as an elaboration of Vlastos’ thesis (Vlastos 1950, 329, notes 39 and 
61)), opposites become causally efficient physical powers (δυνάμεις) 
(Marmodoro 2017, 31-45). On the other hand, both the expansionists and 
the moderationists are committed to some version of a broadly materialistic 
reading of Anaxagoras’ ontology. We thus find interpretations of 
Anaxagorean material stuffs as either (i) particulate in structure with each 
of these particles being either infinitely divisible 6  or infinitely small 
(infinitesimal) (Sorabji 1988), or (ii) akin to chemical compounds, i.e. 
quasi-molecular in structure.7 According to (i) stuffs turn out to be grainy 
and resembling sifted powders whilst according to (ii) they blend like 
liquids or pastes.  
 
For our purposes, it is important to note that practically all of these 
interpretations focus on the mereological aspects of Anaxagoras’ theory, 
i.e. on the way in which he explains the mutual relations of μοῖραι (usually 
rendered as “parts”, “portions”, or “shares” depending on the translation) 
of his (material or immaterial) stuffs. Hence “large/r” and “small/er” refer 
to magnitudes (μέγεθος) of parts of Anaxagorean stuffs. 
 
We take fragment B 3 as central to our mereo-topological interpretation of 
Anaxagoras’ notions of small and large. Some interpreters seem to disagree 
and think that Anaxagoras, at least in certain contexts, takes “small” and 
“large” to refer to relations of an ingredient of a mixture to the mixture 
itself. Typically—and we are somewhat simplifying things here for the 
sake of exposition—they emphasise the fragment B 4b wherein 
Anaxagoras is reported to have said that, in the original mixture, nothing 
 
5 See, e.g. Guthrie (1965), Peck (1926), Barnes (1979), Mourelatos (1986), Furth 
(1991), Graham (1994). 
6 See, e.g. Guthrie (1965), Kerferd (1969), and the discussion in Essay 3 of Curd 
(2007). 
7 See, e.g. Barnes (1979) and Inwood (1986). 
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was manifest “for the mixture of all things prevented it.” Now once the 
claim from B 1 that “nothing was manifest on account of smallness” is 
taken into consideration, a case can be made that smallness and the state of 
ingredients’ being mixed are co-referential. So proposals are put forth 
according to which “small” refers to an ingredient’s being submerged into 
the mixture so as not to be manifest, and “large” to its being emergent from 
the mixture so as to be manifest (Curd 2007, 35, 183–7); similar proposals 
can be found in (Inwood 1986) where “small” and “large” are rendered, 
respectively, as “being mixed” and “being separated out”, and in (Furth 
1991), where “latency” and “manifestness” are used. We cannot fully 
engage with these proposals on this occasion. It is worth noting though that 
even these interpretations cannot fully avoid understanding “large” and 
“small” in a mereological way, at least insofar as properties such as being 
submerged and being mixed seem bound to be understood in terms of the 
relation of being included into a mixture. 
 
However the aforementioned answers to what concretely that which is 
smaller and that which is larger differ amongst themselves, it seems hardly 
contestable that “a smaller” and “a larger” can generally be understood as 
meaning “a smaller part” and “a larger part” of something that exists. After 
all, Anaxagoras himself uses “parts” (μοῖραι) when he says that 
“everything contains parts of everything (πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει)”. 
So, the Anaxagorean universe (τὸ ὅλον) becomes a gunk in the sense of 
David Lewis (1991, 20 et passim), because gunk is defined as that of which 
each part has a proper part. Moreover, since in the above quotations it is 
said of each part that there is always a smaller as well as a greater part, it 
is not only the gunkness axiom but also its inverse that is applicable to the 
universe as everything that exists: each part has a proper part and is a 
proper part of some other part (Arsenijević and Adžić 2014, 141-141).  
 







Now, given the above understanding of the relation between parts, 
whatever they may be, the structure of the Anaxagorean universe—or at 
least its first approximation—formulated in purely mereo-topological 
terms may be represented in the following way: the universe consists of an 
infinite number of nested spheres (diagram 1)—or regions topologically 
homeomorphic to them—ordered by the inclusion relation, where every 
sphere contains infinitely many spheres as its proper parts and is contained 
in infinitely many different spheres included into each other, and where 
between any two spheres there is a sphere larger than one of the two and 
smaller than the other. 
 
3.2.  Ἀπειράκις ἄπειρα: An Infinite Number of Endless Series of 
Nested Parts 
 
The above mereo-topological representation of the structure of the 
Anaxagorean universe turns out to be incomplete, since it represents just 
one endless series of parts, while in Phys. 460.4ff. Simplicius says that, 
according to Aristotle’s account, Anaxagoras holds that the universe (τὸ 
ὅλον), as well as each of its parts (μοῖραι), contains “infinitely many [such] 
unlimiteds” (ἀπειράκις ἄπειρα). This additional characterization is of 
crucial importance because without it we could speak only of parts 
included into each other but not of parts that lie apart from each other or 
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of parts that overlap. In diagram 2 three different endless series are 
represented, where each of them contains parts that lie apart from some of 
the parts of the other two (like the endless series SL’, SM’ and SR’) as well 
as parts that overlap with some parts of the other two (like the endless 
series SL” and SM”, and SM” and SR”). At the same time, all represented 
parts of the three endless series are included into a fourth endless series 
(like SE), but it should be noticed that through the broadening of each of 
the three endless series by more parts into which the represented parts are 
included, the three respective points will finally be reached, after which 
parts of the three series start to overlap with parts of the endless series to 




What the last, completed representation in effect shows is that the whole 
infinite three-dimensional space is covered by the parts of the universe, for 
by starting from any part whatsoever, in any direction outwards there is an 
endless series of parts into which the given part is included, just as in any 
direction inwards there is an endless series of parts which are included in 
the given part. In other words, the Anaxagorean universe can be formally 
represented by means of a region-based system of the infinite three-
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dimensional continuum.8 This is justified by the fact that, historically, 
Anaxagoras’ theory can be seen as an anticipation of Aristotle’s theory of 
the continuum (Ehrlich 2005, 490).  
 
3.3.  Anaxagoras against Zeno: Multitude without Proper Units  
 
Anaxagoras’ mereo-topological account of multitude represents arguably 
one of the first elaborate reactions to Zeno’s argument against plurality. 
While Leucippus and Democritus used Zeno’s arguments in the proof that 
there must be atoms, for otherwise there could allegedly be no plurality 
(Arist. De gen. et corr. 315 a15ff.), Anaxagoras rejected Zeno’s 
assumption that any multitude whatsoever could exist only if there were 
proper units of which it would consist. 
 
The general consensus among the vast majority of scholars is that Zeno’s 
arguments against plurality were the most important external stimulus to 
Anaxagoras’ teachings on multitude. A venerable tradition detects in 
Anaxagoras an “unmistakable dependence upon Zeno” (to put it in Raven’s 
words).9 On the other hand, there are authors who are skeptical towards 
such an attitude and who think that “there is no reason to suspect that Zeno 
influenced Anaxagoras at all” (as Inwood claims).10 Finally, there are even 
those who think that Zeno was answering to Anaxagoras.11 Seeing how the 
relevant doxographical and biographical reports are imprecise enough so 
as not to favour any one of the aforementioned chronological orderings, 
our decision to side with the authors of the first group in what follows shall 
be justified on the basis of the internal logic of Anaxagoras’ teachings. 
 
As far as the relation of Anaxagoras’ and the atomists’ teachings is 
concerned, the ancient accounts are even more uncertain which detracts 
modern and contemporary scholars alike from taking sides. Similarly to the 
previous dilemma, we also believe that here the internal logic of 
Anaxagoras’ teachings points (rather unambiguously) to the fact that his 
theory was originally formulated with the intention of answering not only 
to Zeno but also to Leucippus and Democritus (whose theory is, again as a 




8 For a region-based axiomatization of a three-dimensional continuum see Tarski 
(1929); for the two-dimensional case, see Arsenijević and Adžić (2014), and 
Hellman and Shapiro (2018).  
9 See, e.g. Tannery (1887), Zeller (1922), Cornford (1975), Raven (1954), Kirk 
and Raven (1977), Guthrie (1965), Vlastos (1975), McKirahan (2010).  
10 See, e.g. Furley (1976), Barnes (1979), Schofield (1980), Inwood (1986). 
11 See, e.g. Windelband (1892), Luria (1932), Mau (1957).  
12 The locus classicus is Burnet (1975, 334). 
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In the first branch of his double reductio ad absurdum argument against 
plurality, Zeno has concluded that nothing can consist of entities without 
magnitude (DK 29 B 2). Since Anaxagoras never mentions such entities, 
we may take for granted that he agrees or that he would agree with Zeno 
about this. However, while in the second branch (DK 29 B 1) of his 
argument Zeno has concluded that the multitude cannot consist of entities 
having magnitude either, because the infinite divisibility of the continuum 
(τὸ συνεχές) precludes the existence of proper units (κυρίως ἕν) 13 , 
Anaxagoras rejects that the existence of proper units is a necessary 
condition for the existence of multitude, since parts need not be taken as 
constituents that are ontologically prior to the whole. There can be 
multitudes without simples (DK 59 B 3; cf. also B 6: “the smallest [i.e. a 
minimum] does not exist (τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι)”).14 The universe is 
such a multitude, since it contains no simples. But is then the universe itself 
a complex that can be considered as a unity at all?  
 
3.4.  Anaxagoras against Anaximander: In what Sense is τὸ ὅλον a 
Unity? 
 
Since according to the inverse gunkness axiom there is no sphere 
encompassing all the endless series of nested parts, the universe cannot be 
identified with any one sphere of the infinitely many endless spheres. The 
question is then in what sense τὸ ὅλον is to be understood at all. The answer 
to this question will complete our interpretation of Anaxagoras’ teaching 
on the structure of the universe viewed from a purely mereo-topological 
standpoint. The problem is to find a meaning in which the universe could 
be said to be unified and in that sense something that is one. After all, 
though we translate τὸ ὅλον as universe, it literally means the whole, which 
leaves open the question of the sense in which the whole could be said to 
be one at all. This question—which arises naturally in the course of 
examining the very notion of “Anaxagorean universe”—had not been 
previously addressed in the literature on Anaxagoras, at least as far as we 
know. Answering it ought to be considered a desideratum for every 
reconstruction of Anaxagoras’ cosmology which aims to be complete. 
 
The solution can be found in the above explanation of ἀπειράκις ἄπειρα. 
In spite of the fact that there is not just an infinite number of parts but also 
an infinite number of endless series of nested parts, any two parts, as it is 
shown above, are connected by being contained in a third part. In view of 
 
13  Zeno famously proclaimed: “If you give me a unit, then I will give you 
multitude” (DK 29 A 16; cf. also Simpl. in Phys. 138.29–33 and 144.15). 
14 This represents a part of what Strang calls the “hard core of Anaxagoras’ 
physics” (Strang 1975, 361). 
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this fact, all that exists is interconnected all over the world. It is this 
interconnectedness that makes the universe a whole that can be said to be 
something that is one.  
 
The point can be illustrated by the comparison of the Anaxagorean 
universe with one of the possible interpretations of Anaximander’s many-
worlds thesis, according to which his ἄπειρον generates an infinite number 
of universes, the plurality of which is to be understood only as the 
multiverse and not as the universe any longer. So, reporting on 
Theophrastus’ account of Anaximander’s originative substance, 
Simplicius (in Phys. 24.13), Hippolytus (Ref. I, 6) and Ps.-Plutarch (Strom. 
2) use the plural forms of cosmos and heaven (κόσμοι καὶ οὐρανοί), 
implying clearly that they are not parts of one and the same universe (see 
diagram 3), as the parts of the Anaxagorean τὸ ὅλον are, in the way in 








Anaximander’s “plurality of worlds” thesis has received considerable 
attention in scholarly literature with three main lines of interpretation 
having been formulated: Anaximander believed in (i) infinitely many 
separate single worlds succeeding one another in time15, (ii) infinitely 
many co-existent yet separate worlds16, and (iii) a single world.17 Even 
though historians have not reached a general consensus on the matter, the 
majority favour option (i) as being the closest in spirit to what 
Anaximander possibly could have had in mind. Option (iii) is most difficult 
to fit with the extant testimonia which explicitly speak of “infinite worlds” 
(ἀπείροι κόσμοι) (Aët. Placita, 3, 3, and Pseudo-Plutarch ad loc.). Authors 
 
15  This is the Zellerian tradition: see, e.g. Zeller (1922), Cornford (1934), 
Finkelberg (1994). 
16 This is the Burnetian tradition: see, e.g. Burnet (1975), West (1971), McKirahan 
(2010). 
17 See, e.g. Kahn (1960), Kirk and Raven (1977). 
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who favour it tend to discredit Theophrastus’ account as guilty of “a false 
and anachronistic attribution” (Kirk and Raven 1977, 123). Namely, they 
believe that Theophrastus identified what Anaximander was saying with 
the atomists’ thesis—their worlds are also infinite in number and 
successive (DL IX, 31; cf. also Simpl. in Phys. 1121.5)—and accuse the 
entire doxographical tradition, which relies upon Theophrastus, of being 
guilty of the same mistake. For the purposes of our illustration, it is not 
necessary to go into any minute details and take a decisive stance on the 
matter which of the above interpretations is the right one. For the sake of 
argument, we consider option (ii), since it provides a striking contrast with 
Anaxagoras’ theory. Similarly to Anaximander’s ἄπειρον which is 
spacious enough so as to encompass (περιέχειν) (Hyp. Ref. I, 6) infinitely 
many co-existent yet separate universes (which then makes it a multiverse), 
Anaxagoras’ universe is as spacious so as to contain infinitely many 
worlds. However, it could not be said that there actually are many worlds 
in Anaxagoras’ universe since they are not separated but are all 
interconnected in the manner explained above.  
 
 
4. Heterogeneity in View of the Mereo-Topological Structure of the 
Universe 
 
4.1.  Anaxagoras against Anaximander once Again: The Universe 
Heterogeneity at the Basic Level 
 
Anaximander and Anaxagoras agree that, though the world is obviously 
heterogeneous at the level of appearance, this represents a fact whose 
origin one ought to seek by appealing to a more basic level of reality. What 
they disagree about is that, while Anaximander assumes that the 
underlying ontological basis (ἀρχή), which he calls τὸ ἄπειρον, is not only 
infinite but also qualitatively indefinite (ἀόριστον), so that qualitative 
opposites (ἐναντία) are only to come into being through the differentiation 
of it, Anaxagoras endorses the Parmenidean ex nihilo nihil principle and 
claims that, if there is ever to be heterogeneity, it must have been already 
present in the original stuff from eternity (cf. Galen, De nat. fac. I 2, 4).  
 
We arrive at the indefiniteness of Anaximander’s ἄπειρον indirectly via 
Theophrastus’ account of Anaximenes (ap. Simpl. Phys. 24.26): 
“Anaximenes […], a companion of Anaximander, also says that the 
underlying nature is one and infinite like him, but not indefinite as 
Anaximander said but definite.” (emphasis added) 
 
As far as Parmenides’ principle is concerned, the wording of the canonical 
Latin version most people are familiar with is more similar to the principle 
enunciated by Lucretius in De Rer. Nat. 1.156 (nil posse creari de nihilo) 
than it is to fragment B 8 of Parmenides’ poem Περὶ φύσεως. There 
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Parmenides says that “what is” is uncreated for he does not allow us neither 
to say nor to think (οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν) that it is created “from that 
which is not” (ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος). The clearest attribution of the ex nihilo 
principle to Anaxagoras is to be found in DK 59 B 10 (Scholium on 
Gregory of Nazianzus, Patrologia Graeca 36 911 Migne): “Anaxagoras 
discovered the old belief that nothing comes from that which is not in any 
way whatsoever (Ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας παλαιὸν εὑρὼν δόγμα ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ 
μηδαμῇ γίνεται).”  
 
But then, the question arises whether the heterogeneity at the basic level is 
present there in the same way in which it is present at the level of 
appearance. For, if it were so, what could the difference between the two 
levels consist in at all? This is how we come to the first of the two central 
questions mentioned in the Introduction: How does the mereo-topological 
structure (explained in section 3.) help us in explaining the heterogeneity 
of the original mixture of everything with everything? 
 
4.2.  The Meaning of ἐν παντὶ πάντα Principle in accordance with the 
Mereo-Topological Structure of the Universe: The Maximal 
Heterogeneity in the Original State of the Universe 
 
According to the everything in everything principle (ἐν παντὶ πάντα), one 
of the main ontological principles of Anaxagoras’ cosmology, everything 
contains parts of everything. When applied to the original mixture of 
everything with everything, it means not only that the mixture contains 
everything that can ever become manifest (ἔνδηλος), but more than this, it 
denotes the maximal possible heterogeneity of everything with everything. 
If so, it can be proved, on the basis of the purely mereo-topological 
structure of the universe that in the original mixture (σύμμιξις) there is no 
part that is homogeneous in itself in regard to any qualitative property 
whatsoever. But before we turn to this proof, we must consider why the 
maximal possible heterogeneity is to be assumed at all. 
 
Proceeding analytically, we may notice that, without any further principle 
in addition to the ex nihilo nihil principle, there is no reason why any 
specific distribution of heterogeneity would be assumed to be present in 
the original mixture. But then, in modern terminology, it is the principle of 
indifference that forces us to assume that heterogeneity at the basic level is 
maximal. More precisely, once it is supposed that we ought to assume 
nothing else but what is needed for the very existence of heterogeneity, the 
state of maximum entropy suffices, while at the same time any other state 
would represent some order that requires an additional reason or 
preference. Principia praeter neccessitatem non sunt multiplicanda. This 
shows why the meaning of ἐν παντὶ πάντα principle just explained is 
required for the proof of the non-existence of homogeneous parts in the 
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original mixture. It should be noted that we take entropy here in the most 
general sense as indicating a state of maximal disorder of original mixture. 
However, one should be careful not to take this as implying that 
Anaxagoras’ original mixture is a dynamic system; quite the contrary, it is 
a static system until noûs introduces kinematic factors, i.e. motion into it.18 
 
It is worth noting that the above type of reasoning was not unheard of in 
ancient Greek philosophy. Aristotle reports (De caelo 295 b 10–16) that 
Anaximander thought the Earth does not move due to its equidistance from 
the edges of the universe. Being so positioned, there is no reason why it 
should move in one direction rather than any other and so it remains at rest 
at the centre of the universe. Similarly, there is no reason why Anaxagoras’ 
original mixture should be heterogeneous in any particular way different 
from the heterogeneity in the state of maximal entropy; the obtaining of 
any other heterogeneous state would require there to be some ground for 
imposing order (however minimal) on the default distribution of entities 
which comes about solely through the minimal conditions for the existence 
of heterogeneity.19 
 
4.3.  The Proof that in the Original Mixture there can be no 
Homogeneous Parts 
 
Once we have adopted the above explanation of the ἐν παντὶ πάντα 
principle, it becomes a nice piece of exercise to formulate the proof of the 
non-existence of homogeneous parts, where it is in accordance with the 
principle of charity to suppose that Anaxagoras had some such proof in 
mind.  
 
As in 3.1., where by speaking about “small” and “large” we did not have 
to decide between different interpretations concerning what concretely that 
which is small and that which is large are, so now again we do not have to 
worry about what “everything” (πάντα) may refer to, since Anaxagoras 
himself explicitly says that “everything contains parts of everything” 
(πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει) (DK 59 B 6 and B 16), so that the proof of 
the non-existence of homogeneous parts does not depend on how 
 
18 In other words, it could not be said that Anaxagoras’ universe reached a state of 
maximum entropy given the infinite time (ἄπειρον χρόνον) that passed before the 
intervention of noûs (cf. Arist. Phys. 250 b 26), during which entropy could have 
gradually increased. Thus, strictly speaking, it would be misleading to describe 
Anaxagoras’ universe as a ‘primeval chaos’ in the sense of contemporary chaos 
theory as, e.g. Graham seems to do (cf. Graham 1994, 108ff. and Graham 2006, 
301). 
19 Rescher (1960) provides a historical overview of occurrences of the problem of 
options without preference, the first of which is Anaximander’s argument 
concerning Earth’s position. 
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concretely “parts” are conceived, whether as opposites, seeds, tropes, 
properties of underlying hyletic substances (ὑποκείμενα) or as ontological 
ἀρχαί of any other kind whatsoever. 
 
A good and reliable example that we shall use in the proof are colours, 
since they are one of Anaxagoras’ own examples for the non-existence of 
homogeneous parts in the original mixture of everything with everything. 
He says that, though all colours are present in the original mixture, no 
colour is manifest (οὐδὲ χροιὴ ἔνδηλος ἦν οὐδεμία) (DK 59 B 4b). This 
might be taken as equivalent to saying that there is no part that is 
homogeneous in view of any colour whatsoever. However, it is not so, 
since the statement that no colour is manifest only implies that there is no 
part homogeneous in view of any colour, for if there were such a part, some 
colour would be manifest in the original mixture. But, as we shall see, an 
additional step is necessary in order to show that the implication holds in 
the reverse direction as well. To say that no colour is manifest is more than 
to say that there are no homogeneous parts in view of any colour. 
 
Let us suppose that there is a part for which it is true that redness is present 
in each of its parts. Wittgenstein would then say that this part is certainly 
homogeneous in regard to its colour (Wittgenstein 1929). 20  Not so 
Anaxagoras! From the mereo-topological point of view, given that each 
part is infinitely complex, the fact that redness is present in each part of 
the given part does not preclude that some other colour is also present in 
each of the parts. As an analogy, according to Dedekind (1872) and Cantor 
(1895), there is no segment of the field of positive real numbers represented 
by a straight line endless on one side in which there are no rational 
numbers, but this does not mean that there is any segment in which there 
are no irrational numbers as well. The analogy is not jeopardised by the 
fact that in the case of the Dedekind-Cantor axiom the rationals and 
irrationals are extensionless while Anaxagoras’ parts are not. After all, 
both rationals and irrationals can be represented as stretches between 
rational and irrational numbers respectively. The point-based and the 
stretch-based systems are mutually obtainable with the use of two sets of 
suitably chosen translation rules (Arsenijević and Kapetanović 2008).  
 
The analogy between the case of colours and the case of numbers has to do 
only with the nature of infinity. The infinite complexity makes it possible 
for there to be enough room for an infinite number of red parts and an 
infinite number of yellow parts to be present in any part of a given part, as 
it is the case with the overlapping parts of the series of red spheres and the 
series of yellow spheres in diagram 4 below. In the same diagram there is 
 
20 Cf. Ramsey (1923), Schlick (1969), Waismann (1971, 57–58). 
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also a common part of the red, yellow and blue spheres, in which all the 
three colours are present in each of its parts. So, if ἐν παντὶ πάντα principle 
implies the maximal possible heterogeneity, there can be no part 
homogeneous in view of any colour. By generalizing the result, we get that 
there can be no part homogeneous in view of a property of any kind 
whatsoever. Such a generalization is justified in light of B 10, where it is 
explicitly stated that what holds in the case of colours holds in the same 






4.4. The Proof that in the Original Mixture no Colour can be 
Manifest 
 
As a nice illustration of the difference between Anaximander and 
Anaxagoras in view of the explanation of the fact about which they would 
agree—that at the basic level of reality no colour is manifest—we may 
consider the famous Newton’s experiment (cf. Opticks, Book 1, Part II, 
Prop. II, Theor. II et passim) in which a narrow beam of sunlight, in which 
no colour is manifest, passes through a triangular glass prism and, after 
having been projected on a wall, appears as a rainbow bend of manifest 
colours (see diagram 5).  
 







If we take the beam of sunlight before it passes through a triangular glass 
prism as representative of the original state in which nothing is manifest 
and the rainbow bend of colours as representative of the level of 
appearance, Anaximander would say that the sunbeam originally contains 
no colour at all, while Anaxagoras would say that it contains all the 
colours that are to appear in the rainbow bend of colours. Now, 
independently of the explanation of how and why non-manifest colours 
become manifest, Anaxagoras has to explain in the first place why colours 
are not manifest in the sunbeam, given that they are presumably present in 
it. As we have suggested above, the very fact that in the original mixture 
there are no homogeneous parts whatsoever does not suffice. Namely, one 
could use the idea of Empedocles’ physics and say that one 
(monochromatic) colour could be predominant and as such manifest in the 
beam of sunlight. In order to show that this is not possible according to 
Anaxagoras’ assumptions, we have to compare his physics with the 
physics of Empedocles. 
 
For our purposes, it is not important to work out precisely and decide 
definitively whether Empedocles influenced Anaxagoras or vice versa, or 
which of the two philosophers is older and which younger. These questions 
are somewhat controversial, especially because of what Aristotle says in 
Met. 984 a 11, namely that “Anaxagoras was prior (πρότερος) to 
Empedocles in age yet posterior [ὕστερος: literally, later] in his activities”. 
It suffices that Empedocles’ theory could have been known to Anaxagoras 
(and vice versa) without there being any need for assuming any 
interdependence or interaction between the two theories for our 
comparison to work. However, since we intend to occasionally compare 
certain aspects of Anaxagoras’ theory with those of Empedocles’ theory 
for illustrative purposes, it is necessary to state the basic tenets of 
Empedocles’ physics in order for such illustrations to function as intended. 
Here as elsewhere, we do not wish to engage in various scholarly 
controversies but rather to provide a minimalist account of those aspects of 
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Empedocles’ theory which are sufficient for elucidating our points about 
Anaxagoras. 
 
The central part of Empedocles’ poem is DK 31 B 17. There we find out 
that the basic items of Empedocles’ ontology are the elemental “roots” 
(ῥιζώματα)—fire, water, air, and earth—and that they are involved in a 
continuous and infinite cycle governed by two cosmic powers, Love and 
Strife (i.e. the attractive and the repulsive force, respectively). The cosmic 
cycle is divided into four stages, the first being the so-called “triumph of 
Love”, i.e. an ideal limit to the process of gradual mixing and 
interpenetrating of the roots represented by a sphere, and the last being the 
“triumph of Strife” where the roots are completely separated as if the 
sphere were cut apart in four sections. Contrary to Barnes (1979, 242–243), 
the triumph of Love should not be conceived as the “homogenous 
sphere”—the actually completed mixing of the roots—but only as a never-
completing process of their mutual interpenetration. The other two stages 
are transitional between these two extremes. It is important to note that 
even though during the triumph of Love the roots “run through each other” 
(DK 31 B 21), they nonetheless remain qualitatively distinct no matter how 
thorough the mixture might be — “they are always unchanged in a cycle” 
(DK 31 B 17, emphasis added) in the sense that they can never completely 
interpenetrate so as to become co-located. There are no traces of any other 
elements in, say, water. In other words, water is not predominantly water 
but water through and through. Any interpretation that does not take this 
into account ought to be rejected. 
 
The crucial thing is that Empedocles’ cosmology doesn’t allow the state of 
maximum entropy. Namely, however fire, water, earth, and air as the 
heterogeneous “roots” (ῥιζώματα) of everything were mixed, there could 
be no part of the universe in which they would be co-located. The roots 
may be mixed more and more again, but never absolutely, since there 
where one of them is present, no other can be. However, the mereo-
topological structure of the Anaxagorean universe allows the state of 
maximum entropy in which there is no part not containing everything. In 
such a state, there can be no predominance in quantity (ἐπικρατεῖν πλήθει) 
of any property (colour in our case), since (the number of heterogeneous 
parts being infinite) any two sets such that the members of one of them and 
the members of the other are heterogeneous amongst themselves are 
equinumerous.  
 
Interpretations according to which predominance is understood as 
predominance in quantity are not rare. The above discussion suffices to 
show why such views cannot be satisfactory. Surprisingly, this kind of view 
can be found even in authors who recognize the gunky nature of 
Anaxagoras’ universe, e.g. in the works of Anna Marmodoro (2015, 2017). 
Marmodoro tries to show that Anaxagoras’ infinitism is not incompatible 
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with the predominance of quantity with the use of the example of prime 
numbers whose density is greater at initial segments than it is in the further 
expansion of the infinite series of natural numbers (Marmodoro 2017, 97). 
But this example is inadequate in the context of Anaxagoras’ cosmology 
because it concerns the comparison in density between different segments 
that have finitely many members, while each part of the Anaxagoras’ 
universe contains only parts which themselves presumably contain an 
infinite number of parts.  
 
4.5. The Thoroughgoing Infinitism: From the Mathematical Principle 
of Space Isotropy to Anaxagoras’ Fractal Structure of the Physical 
Universe  
 
One of the basic assumptions practically operative during the whole history 
of Greek geometry can be called the principle of space isotropy. Generally, 
this principle refers to uniformity of space in all directions, which is, 
especially in the case of Greek geometry, essential for the similarity 
between any two parts of the same dimension in view of divisibility and 
magnitude, be these parts one-dimensional segments, two-dimensional 
areas or three-dimensional regions. The principle, in the context of Greek 
geometry, amounts to the following two tenets. First, all segments, areas 
and regions are endlessly divisible no matter how division is performed, 
meaning that there are no indivisible parts of entities of any dimension 
whatsoever. Second, in spite of the infinite divisibility, there are no parts 
that are either infinitely smaller or infinitely larger than any given part of 
some geometrical entity of the same dimension, so that all parts that are of 
the same dimension belong to one and the same category: there are no 
infinitely small just as there are no infinitely large parts.21 
 
Now, one of the nicest reductio ad absurdum arguments in the whole 
history of Greek philosophy might appear as being directed against the 
principle of isotropy. This is the proof of Leucippus and/or Democritus in 
favour of the existence of atoms. The proof is reproduced in detail by 
Aristotle in De gen. et corr. 315 a 15ff. It runs as follows. 
 
Let us suppose, following the principle of isotropy, that a given body is 
divisible everywhere (σῶμα πάντῃ διαιρετόν), and also that it is 
simultaneously (ἅμα) divided everywhere where it is divisible. What will 
remain at the end of such a division? It is impossible that what remains are 
some entities of a lower dimension, because this would mean that the 
original body could be recomposed out of them, which is precluded by 
what Aristotle calls Zeno’s axiom (Met. 1001 b 7). But it is also impossible 
 
21 The second tenet is codified by what Stolz has called Archimedes’ axiom (Stolz 
1881 and 1883).  
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that what remains are entities of the same dimension as the original body 
was before division, since they would then be further divisible, which is 
contrary to the hypothesis that the original body has been divided 
everywhere. So, in order to avoid the contradictions along both branches 
of the argument, we must assume that, contrary to the hypothesis, the body 
is not divisible everywhere. 
 
Aristotle praises the argument as the attempt to reply to Zeno’s proof 
against plurality by questioning some other, tacit hypothesis instead of the 
main hypothesis that the plurality exists, but he considers the atomist 
argument not conclusive either. His own solution is that what ought to be 
rejected is not the hypothesis that the given body is divisible everywhere 
but only that it is divisible simultaneously (ἅμα) everywhere where it is 
divisible. In such a way the rejection of the principle of isotropy is avoided.  
 
In his comment of the atomists’ argument in De caelo 303 a 20 and 306 a 
26, Aristotle explicitly accuses them of “coming into conflict with our most 
exact science, namely mathematics” which could be understood as a 
criticism directed against their apparent violation of the principle of space 
isotropy. However, according to the interpretation Vlastos has offered to 
Furley (in Furley 1984, 513, note 17), and with which we agree, the 
“conflict” is to be understood as the incongruence between mathematics 
and the physics of Leucippus and Democritus rather than as the 
incompatibility between their understanding of mathematics with one of 
the basic mathematical principles, namely the principle of space isotropy. 
After all, Democritus was known as a great mathematician22, and it is 
highly unlikely that he wanted to question one of the basic principles of 
geometry. 
 
We come now to what is our main concern, that is, to what Anaxagoras has 
to say about the relation between mathematics and physics. What we have 
said in 3.1. and 3.3. clearly implies that Anaxagoras does not want to 
question the principle of isotropy in mathematics. So, the question is only 
how he would react to the above argument of Leucippus and Democritus, 
independently of whether we assume that he was acquainted with it or not. 
Given that he often speaks of parts of the universe in the unqualified sense 
and that in his teaching there is nowhere any trace of atomism, we can take 
for granted that he would not agree with the conclusion of the atomist 
reductio ad absurdum argument. And then, given that he speaks nowhere 
of the extensionless entities of any kind whatsoever, the only reasonable 
option is that he would say that the set of alternatives offered in the 
 
22 As is evidenced by the list of his mathematical works given in DK 68 A 31.  
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conclusion is not exhaustive. He would simply say that by any division 
whatsoever one can get nothing else but something that is also divisible. 
 
What we may infer from the above analysis of what Anaxagoras should 
have to say on the basis of his teaching taken as a whole is that he is, 
contrary to all other Greek philosophers including Aristotle, a 
thoroughgoing infinitist: in Anaxagoras the validity of the principle of 
isotropy is not restricted to mathematics, but it holds in relation to physics 
as well. More elaborately put, all parts of the universe in its original state 
are similar not only mathematically, in the sense of space isotropy, but also 
physically, in view of what they contain, since each contains everything 
that any other contains.  
 
It is strange how many authors tend to classify Anaxagoras among 
precursors of non-Archimedean mathematics when he is obviously a 
thoroughgoing anti-infinitesimalist (so much so that he has been described 
as anticipating Bolzano and Cantor (Sinnige 1971, 129–137). However, 
Raven (1954) and others23 see him as a revolutionary who introduces the 
notion of the infinitesimal. Such interpretations are probably motivated by 
fragment B 1 24  where the words ἄπειρα σμικρότητα and τὸ σμικρὸν 
ἄπειρον ἦν appear which are usually rendered as “infinite smallness” or 
“infinitely small”. However, this should be read in light of what 
Anaxagoras says in B 3: the fact that “of the small there is always a smaller” 
does not entail that there is actually anything which would be infinitely 
small. The “infinitely small” is to be understood in the sense of containing 
infinitely many smaller parts (since “there is always a smaller”), and not as 
being itself infinitely small, i.e. infinitesimal.  
 
Interestingly, even though Vlastos originally 25  endorsed the non-
Archimedean reading of Anaxagoras, he later came to endorse the opposite 
view, which we share. We reproduce the remarks from the revised version 
of his paper in extenso (Vlastos 1975, 341, note 1): “I have made no 
substantive changes in the text, with one exception: I have eliminated 
references to ‘the infinitesimal’ and even to ‘the infinitely small’ in 
Anaxagoras. As I have since come to see (in the course of trying to thread 
my way through Zeno’s paradoxes) the notion of ‘the infinitesimal’ is a 
confused one, and even the expression ‘infinitely small’ is misleading. 
There is some excuse for using the latter, since Anaxagoras himself said 
practically the same thing in such a phrase as τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. There 
is none whatever for using the former, for there is absolutely no basis in the 
 
23 Cf. also Kirk and Raven (1977), Guthrie (1965), Sorabji (1988), Gershenson 
and Greenberg (1964). 
24 It is interesting to note how reading of B 1 in isolation causes similar problems 
to those we resolved in 3.1. 
25 “The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras” appeared in 1950 and was included in 
Allen and Furley’s (1975) collection. 
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fragments for thinking that Anaxagoras was guilty of the confusions 
epitomized by that term. In B 3 he gives us an admirably precise statement 
of what he means.” (emphasis added) In addition to this, most historians of 
ancient Greek mathematics would agree that it was Archimedean in that it 
contained no references whatsoever to infinitesimals.  
 
Now, given that any part of the universe contains infinitely many 
parts not only in the purely mereo-topological sense but also if these 
parts are taken as containing the physical heterogeneity of the 
universe as the whole, then given the principle of maximal 
heterogeneity that holds for the original mixture of everything with 
everything, the universe in its original state is fractal in the sense that 
any two parts are similar to each other not only in view of the 
smaller-larger relation that holds between the parts contained in 
them—“the parts of the large and the small are equal in quantity” 
(ἴσα πλῆθος ἐντοῖσι μείζοσί τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι)—but also in view of the fact 
that every part is similar to any other part in regard to what they contain. 
 
This conclusion can be confirmed by a direct quotation from Simplicius 
(in Phys. 460.4ff. = DK 59 A 45), where he speaks of Aristotle’s account 
of homoeomeries, i.e. of “parts similar amongst themselves”. It is explicitly 
said there that each of the homoeomeries (ἑκάστην ὁμοιομέρειαν) is 
similar to the whole (ὁμοίως τῷ ὅλῳ) in that it contains everything within 
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Even though both Aristotle (see, e.g. Phys. 203 a 19–33) and the entire 
doxographical tradition unanimously ascribe some kind of 
“homoemerism” to Anaxagoras and repeat it (ad nauseam) as a defining 
feature of his theory, many modern authors deny that there can be 
“Anaxagorean homoeomerism”. These include, among others, Peck 
(1926), Guthrie (1965), Furley (1967), Graham (1994), Mathewson (1958) 
and Curd (2007). Others, such as Barnes (1979) and Teodorsson (1982), 
just deny it the role of a fundamental principle of Anaxagoras’ physics. 
While it is true that the term ὁμοιομερές and its cognates do not appear in 
the extant fragments (B-fragments), and that it was probably coined by 
Aristotle, this does not mean however that Anaxagoras could not have been 
an ante litteram “homoeomereologist” (the term is Lanza’s (1966, 50)): he 
“could have articulated the concept of homoeomereity without having used 
Aristotle’s terminology” (Sisko 2009, 92).  
 
It is important to note that homoeomerism is primarily a mereo-topological 
notion, since it deals with the like-partedness in terms of the larger-smaller, 
the parthood and inclusion relations, as well as in terms of spatial 
partitioning, i.e. infinite divisibility.26 As such, it can also be formalised by 
means of some region-based theory as discussed in 3.2. Interestingly, by 
basing spatial regions upon spheres, the above representation (diagram 6) 
also agrees with Simons’ formal account of homoeomeries (cf. Simons 
2003, 220). Such a characterisation of homoeomerism would be purely 
quantitative.  
 
However, there is also a qualitative aspect to homoeomerism, since the 
like-partedness also has to do with the likeness-in-kind of the parts and the 
whole to which they belong. In other words, Anaxagoras’ homoeomerism 
demands that parts and wholes be similar in view of non-quantitative 
properties as well (this explains the appearance of colours on diagram 6 
above27). In light of the everything-in-everything principle, this means that 
the universe as a whole and any of its spatial sub-regions (parts) are 
homeoemerous, since they are exactly alike in view of all quantitative and 
qualitative properties. This also shows why translating ὁμοιομέρειαι as 
“homogenous parts” or “homogenous stuffs” is wrong28 — namely, just as 
the original mixture is maximally possibly heterogeneous, so are all of its 
parts as well.  
 
It is interesting to note that some authors, like Anna Marmodoro, consider 
the previously described structural complexity of Anaxagorean universe in 
its original state as “defying representation”, “incomprehensible” or 
“unintelligible” (Marmodoro 2017, 112–113). However, in light of Sextus 
 
26 This has been emphasized already in Sisko (2009) and in Sharvy (1983). 
27 Here, as well as in 4.4., colours are taken as an illustration standing for all other 
properties.  
28 As is done in, e.g. Curd (2007). It could be said that the mixture and its parts are 
quasi-homogenous since they are thoroughly mixed. 
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Empiricus’ distinction (which can be taken as locus classicus:  Adv. Phys. 
390–392) between objects that are perceptible (αἰσθητά), imaginable 
(φαντασιωτά29) and intelligible (νοητά), it is not clear why the structure of 
Anaxagoras’ universe and its parts would not be said to be intelligible in 
spite of the fact that it is neither perceptible nor imaginable. Namely, it 
could be stated to be unintelligible only after it were proved that the very 
notion of such a structure is self-contradictory. But, given that region-based 
mereo-topology and fractal geometry, which serve as mathematical models 
of Anaxagoras’ physics, are not inconsistent, being as such intelligible, 
there is no reason why the same would not hold for Anaxagoras’ physics 
as well, i.e. for his theory of the fractal and homoeomeric physical universe, 
in its original state at least. 
 
So, if the universe were counterfactually broken into whatever number of 
parts, they would all be completely similar amongst themselves. In that 
sense the universe can be said to be fractal. The principle of fractality of 
the physical universe is in congruence with the principle of space isotropy, 
and in that sense Anaxagoras is the only Greek physicist who, due to his 
thoroughgoing infinitism, has made physics completely congruent with 
mathematics. 
 
The only aspect in which the parts obtained by a counterfactual breaking-
apart of the universe were not similar to the original whole consists in the 
fact that for them the inverse gunkness axiom would not hold any longer. 
But this follows analytically from the fact that they are proper parts of the 
universe, while the universe as a whole (τὸ ὅλον) is not a proper part of 
anything. However, for any part being a proper part of the universe and 
not as something obtained by a counterfactual breaking-apart of the 
universe, the inverse gunkness axiom does hold, since there is no largest 
sphere encompassing either a part of the universe or the universe as a 
whole.  
 
Similarly to the case of Anaximander discussed in 3.4. above, there are 
authors who attribute to Anaxagoras the “plurality of worlds” thesis on 
account of DK 58 B 4a, with the usual interpretation viewing Anaxagorean 
universe as containing multiple separate yet co-existent worlds (see, e.g. 
Burnet 1975 or Barnes 1979). However, such a reading seems to flatly 
contradict both what Anaxagoras himself emphasises in fragment B 8—“in 
the one cosmos (ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ 30  κόσμῳ)” (emphasis added)—and what 
Aristotle and Simplicius attribute to him, namely that he only believes and, 
consequently, speaks of a single cosmos only (ἕνα τὸν κόσμον) (cf. Arist. 
Phys. 250 b 18ff. and Simpl. in Phys. 178.25). So, even Simplicius who, as 
 
29 From the verb φαντασιόω employed by Sextus himself ad loc.  
30 ἑνὶ can here be taken as indicating either uniqueness or internal unity of a given 
cosmos. We see no reason not to take it in the first sense.  
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Gregory (2007, 109) rightfully notices, tended to find more many-worlds 
theorists than there actually were, nowhere classifies Anaxagoras as one of 
them. The fundamental obstacle to any many-worlds interpretation of 
Anaxagoras, which constitutes a sufficient reason for rejecting it, is the 
aforementioned fact that the statement about the existence of separate 
“worlds” would violate the inverse gunkness axiom, which guarantees the 
interconnectedness of all parts of the universe taken as a whole (τὸ ὅλον) 
(see 3.4. above). In other words, one cannot maintain the many-worlds 
interpretation without thereby sacrificing a basic tenet of Anaxagoras’ 
teaching on multitude (B 3). An additional reason for rejecting such a 
reading would be that Anaxagoras simply could not individuate multiple 
co-existent worlds within the universe as a whole (τὸ ὅλον) if these worlds 
ought to be all exactly alike (Vlastos 1975, 359). 
 
However, there is another line of interpretation which allows us to speak—
albeit only metaphorically—about many worlds in Anaxagoras without 
thereby contradicting any of the points which we previously established. 
This so-called “Leibnizian reading” of Anaxagoras’ many-worlds thesis 
has been recently advocated by John E. Sisko (2003). The basic idea is that 
Anaxagoras can be seen as endorsing an early version of the Leibnizian 
monadological thesis according to which there exist “worlds within worlds 
to infinity” (mundi in mundis ad infinitum) (cf. Leibniz A VI, 2, 226). Such 
an interpretation essentially depends on the fractality of the universe in the 
above explained sense. The following explanation should be taken as 
holding at least for the original mixture without thereby suggesting 
anything about the state after the intervention of noûs. 
 
As Strang has justly emphasised (by focusing especially on fragment B 6), 
complexity for Anaxagoras is not a function of size (Strang 1975, 366). Put 
into more technical terms, this basically corresponds to an important 
feature of fractals, namely invariance under scaling (i.e. transformation of 
scale). This gets us to the most important feature of fractals — self-
similarity: fractals which are invariant under ordinary geometric similarity 
are called self-similar (Mandelbrot 1982, 18).31 For Anaxagoras, structural 
complexity is recursive all the way up and all the way down. The universe 
as a whole and all of its parts are structured in exactly the same manner. In 
effect, the notion of self-similarity in this sense also corresponds to the 
previously explained notion of homeomereity: if we were to zoom into any 
part of the universe with a theoretical microscope (illustrated in diagram 6 
above) we could observe that it is exactly alike in every respect—that is, 
not only in view of all structural and quantitative but also in view of all 
qualitative properties—to the universe as a whole. However, this should 
not be taken as suggesting that there is ever more than one world in the 
Anaxagorean universe. Every part of the universe is a “world” only 
metaphorically in virtue of the universe as a whole being self-replicating 
 
31 Interestingly, Leibniz was probably the first to study self-similarity.  
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and everywhere self-similar. And, finally, as Grujić rightfully notes, 
fractality is congruent with isotropy (Grujić 2002, 51).  
 
 
5. Necessity of Existence of two Different Successive Stages of the 
Universe: The Intervention of Noûs as the Singular Cosmic Event 
 
By generalising the example concerning colours, we have concluded in 
4.4. that in the state of maximum entropy of the original mixture there is 
no property of any kind whatsoever that could be manifest, which is the 
consequence of the mereo-topological structure of the universe and the 
maximal possible heterogeneity assumption. This in effect means that, if 
different “things” (χρήματα) present in the original mixture, however 
concretely specified, are to become manifest, this can happen only in a 
state of the universe which is radically different from the state of maximum 
entropy. To explain in which way the difference between the two states is 
to be understood exactly, and how it is brought about through the 
intervention of noûs, represents a big task which lies outside the scope of 
this paper. But, without going into detail, we may put in general terms in 
what sense the difference must be radical and why the two states must be 
chronologically successive, thus vindicating speaking about them as 
different stages of the universe. The comparison with Empedocles’ 
cosmology may be of use again. 
 
As we have seen in 4.4., Empedocles’ cosmology doesn’t allow the state 
of the maximal possible heterogeneity within the parts of the universe, 
because it is impossible for any two “roots” of everything to be completely 
co-located in one and the same part. Any complex part actually contains 
some finite number of strictly separated parts, each of them occupied by a 
single “root”, and though this number can always be greater than it actually 
is, it can never become infinite. So, the infinity related to the number of 
parts is only potential in Aristotle’s sense. Consequently, any difference 
between any two states—no matter how close one of them is to the triumph 
of Love in view of the greatness of the number of heterogeneous parts 
present in the mixture of “roots” in any of the parts of the universe—must 
always be a matter of degree. Contrary to this, in Anaxagoras’ cosmology 
the original mixture is the single state in which entropy is maximal and 
from which any other state differs radically and not only in degree. Due to 
this radical difference, any state of the universe that is not the original state 
may occur only after the original state, belonging as such to the second 
stage of the universe viewed chronologically. 
 
The transition from the first stage, which was the state of the universe from 
eternity (ἐξ αἰῶνος), to the second stage, in which what was 
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undistinguishable in the original mixture is to become manifest (ἔνδηλος), 
is caused by noûs, whose intervention as the singular event in the 
Anaxagorean cosmogony is in that respect similar to the big bang in 
modern cosmology. 
 
What makes Anaxagoras’ cosmogony unique in the history of ancient 
Greek cosmogony is exactly the postulating of such a singular event. This 
is evidenced by both Aristotle (Phys. 187 a 21ff.) and Simplicius (in Phys. 
154.30) who agree that for Anaxagoras the “cosmos was born only once 
(ἅπαξ γενόμενος ὁ κόσμος)” (emphasis added), i.e. it began at some instant 
(νῦν). Interestingly, Aristotle even criticises Anaxagoras on this account in 
Phys. 252 a 15ff., claiming that such a singular event is “no longer to be 
considered as a work of nature (οὐκέτι φύσεως ἔργον)”; in other words, it 
is non-natural and inexplicable. Thus, Anaxagoras might be seen as the first 
proponent and Aristotle as the first opponent of Big Bang type of theories 
(cf. Gregory 2007, 172). This salient feature of Anaxagorean cosmogony 
is usually not sufficiently emphasised in the relevant literature but rather 
only incidentally touched upon (case in point being Gregory 2007). 
However, Cleve proposed a reading similar to the one developed in this 
paper already in 1917 — to him it was “evident” that “cosmogony had to 
start from one point” and that Anaxagoras in thinking that was “alone, 
almost32, among the philosophers of ancient Greece” (cf. Cleve 1973, 45, 
132ff.).33 Cleve explicitly says that “the ‘beginning of cosmopoeia’ (ἀρχὴ 
τῆς κοσμοποιίας) must have been meant as a true beginning in time.” 
(Cleve 1973, 134; emphasis added) 
 
The above results obtained analytically from Anaxagoras’ teachings on 
multitude and on heterogeneity taken as a whole should be faced with the 
following passage from Simplicius (in Phys. 461.10–16): 
 
[…] Anaxagoras  […] gave a riddled double account of the [world] 
order: the one general (ἡνωμένην), intelligible (νοητὴν), always 
present and time-independent (οὐ χρόνῳ), (for it does not change in 
time), subsistent both in view of what is (οὐσίας) and in view of 
what can be (δυνάμεως); the other distinguished from the former 
(διακεκριμένην ἀπὸ ταύτης) but in accordance with it (κατὰ ταύτην), 




32 This restriction is due to the fact that Simplicius also mentions Archelaos and 
Metrodoros of Chios as advancing similar theses to Anaxagoras’ in regard to 
cosmogony (cf. in Phys. 1121.21).  
33 Interestingly enough, Cleve had no modern cosmological model such as the Big 
Bang that could have motivated his interpretation. Lemaître proposed it in 1927 
and the very term “big bang” appeared only in 1949. 






In view of our reconstruction, the explanation of the “riddled double 
account of the world order” is straightforward (see diagram 7). The “first 
order” is “general” (or “uniform”) because it concerns the purely mereo-
topological structure of the universe, which is “always present and time-
independent” due to the fact that the relation between the universe as a 
whole and its parts as well as the relations between its parts remain the 
same independently of how the cosmic stuff is distributed or redistributed 
in view of non-manifest or manifest heterogeneity. This explains, at the 
same time, why the “second order” is “in accordance with the first one” in 
spite of the fact that it concerns the second stage of the universe at which 
what was undistinguishable has become manifest, and which makes the 
second order “distinguished” from the first one. And then, the “generality” 
of the first order along with the relation between the two orders explains 
why the “first order” is “intelligible” also in regard to the first stage of the 
universe where no heterogeneity is manifest, since its intelligibility does 
not depend on perceptual distinguishability. And finally, the fact that the 
difference between two orders is not a matter of degree, there must be a 
singular event that, due to the “demiurgic noûs”, separates the two 
successive stages of the universe. 
 
Simplicius ascribes double world order to Anaxagoras also in in Phys. 
157.17 and in Cael. 608.32. Some of Simplicius’ remarks in the 
surrounding text have been taken by some interpreters, like Curd and 
Schofield, as indicative of his Neoplatonic interpretation of Anaxagoras, 
which they themselves consider unacceptable (Curd 2007, 214) and 
“hopelessly ahistorical” (Schofield 1996, 5). In Simplicius’ differentiation 
between what is noetic and what is perceptible Curd finds speaking of two 
different “ontological levels” (Curd 2007, 212, 214). In similar vein, 
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Schofield finds in in Phys. 34.18ff. a picture on which Anaxagoras posits 
an original ur-condition of unity, a “purely intelligible kosmos” that ensues 
from the original ur-condition, and finally our perceptible kosmos as a 
derivation of the intelligible kosmos (Schofield 1996, 4). 
 
However, there is no good reason to take Simplicius’ speaking of “the 
ordering that is [only] intelligible” and “that which is perceptible” as 
relating to two different ontological levels, since he himself explains this 
rather epistemological than ontological difference by claiming that in the 
former “all things were together” while in the latter “they have been made 
separate from that unification by demiurgic noûs” (in Cael. 608.32ff.). This 
can be completely understood with our explanation given above and 
illustrated in diagram 7, where the difference in question is represented 
“horizontally”, as the difference between chronologically successive 
stages and not “vertically”, as the difference between ontological levels. 
After all, the alleged Neoplatonic rendering of Anaxagoras does not fit well 
with what Simplicius states elsewhere about Anaxagoras’ cosmology. For 
instance, as we have seen, in B 2 he ascribes to Anaxagoras the claim that 
“air and aether were separated off (ἀποκρίνονται) from the all-
encompassing multitude (ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος)”. Separation 
of air and aether appears to be the initial separation from the original 
mixture (according to B 2) so that air and aether “covered all things” 
(according to B 1 and B 2 taken together), and the text suggests that such 
a separation was an eminently hyletic affair and not some Neoplatonic 
emanation from an intelligible realm. 
 
And finally, if we wanted to reject the Neoplatonic interpretation and yet 
at the same time avoid the suggested interpretation according to which 
there must be the singular event in Anaxagoras’ cosmology—something 
that is indeed incongruent with the “spirit” of the whole Greek 
philosophy—we might take the account of the “original state” as the 
counterfactual description of what the universe would look like if all the 
things were mixed together, from which de facto any state of the universe 
is always more or less different. 34  But, no matter how ingenious and 
exciting this interpretation may make Anaxagoras appear to today’s 
analytic philosophers, it is of course highly unlikely that Anaxagoras 
actually made such a proposal. On the other hand, as for those who have 
an affinity for finding in Anaxagoras’ teaching early anticipations of 
significant notions and ideas of contemporary physics, they can be said to 
be right when taking the idea of the noûs intervention as the singular event 
as a precursor of the Big Bang theory. 
 
 
34 Such an interpretation has been advanced in Fränkel (1955) and Vlastos (1959). 
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6. Concluding Remark  
 
In the present article we have tried to give a consistent and historically 
authentic answer to the first of the two central questions concerning the 
relation between Anaxagoras’ teachings on multitude and on 
heterogeneity, which explains why in the original mixture nothing was 
manifest in spite of the fact that everything that has become manifest at the 
second stage of the universe, resulting from the intervention of noûs, must 
have been already present there from eternity. 
 
The second central question is complementary to the first one. How the 
manifest heterogeneity is possible at all, given that the first cosmic order is 
general, remaining the same forever? The answer to this question is tricky 
and requires an insightful philological in addition to an inventive 
philosophical analysis, because Anaxagoras is explicit in B 6 that “if it is 
not possible that there is the smallest, it would not be possible to be 
separated (χωρισθῆναι) or to come into being by itself, but just as at the 
beginning (ὅπωσπερ ἀρχήν) so also now (καὶ νῦν), everything would be 
together (πάντα ὁμοῦ)”. A way must be found to reconcile this claim with 
the general principle stated in B 3, that “of the small there is not the 
smallest, but always a smaller”. Postponing the answer to this difficult 
question to some later occasion, we may only note that, if Anaxagoras is 
to be interpreted in a consistent manner, then either we are wrong when 
claiming that B 3 states the principle of the general order or there is some 
way to explain in what sense the necessity of “the smallest” at the level of 
appearance, stated in B 6, does not contradict the general principle stated 
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